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Nuclear Power Plant Siting: A Comparative
Analysis of Public Interaction in the Siting
Process in France and the United States
STEVEN A. CHRISTENSEN*
The world is rapidly depleting its energy reserves. When
oil prices skyrocketed in November of 1973, as a result of the
Arab oil embargo, alternative sources of energy were ardently
sought. The oil embargo brought to the attention of millions
what environmental groups have been telling us for
years-natural resources are a finite commodity which we are
expending at such a dangerously rapid rate, that if alternative
energy sources are not developed immediately our present eco-
nomic lifestyle may be short-lived.
The embargo poignantly reminded the United States and
other industrialized nations of the degree to which they depend
on foreign energy resources. This prompted President Nixon to
implement new energy programs, demanding, among other
things, that Americans conserve energy in order to help reduce
our dependence on foreign oil.'
In recognition of the world's need for alternative energy
sources, this paper will examine several nuclear power plant
siting questions with a special focus on public concerns in both
France and the United States.
Dr. Dixie Lee Ray, the former chairperson of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), stated in a speech
to the European Nuclear Society that most opposition to nu-
clear power stems from fear.' This fear is a combination of both
the known and unknown effects of the widespread use of nu-
clear power. From sickness and death caused by unseen radia-
tion to fear of a major nuclear accident, the public is becoming
acutely aware of the perils of the nuclear age. The public fear
* B.A., 1975, Brigham Young University; J.D. candidate, 1979, University of
Denver College of Law.
1. See Statement by the President Announcing a Series of Actions to Deal with
the Energy Crisis, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 867 (June 29, 1973). See also President's
Message to Congress, 119 CONG. REc. 12889 (1973).
2. A. LovINS & J. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE FOR AN ETHICAL ENERGY
STRATEGY xvii (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. LoviNs].
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of nuclear power must be balanced against the needs of an
industrial world for alternative energy sources.
3
I. NUCLEAR POWER IN FRANCE
A. History of Atomic Energy in France
France's first encounter with atomic energy started in the
laboratories of Henri Becquerel and Fr6d6ric and Irene Joliot-
Curie in 1934 with the discovery of artificial radioactivity.' In
1945, following World War II, there was official state recogni-
tion of the potentially peaceful uses of atomic energy.' Since
October 1945, when Charles de Gaulle established the French
Atomic Energy Commission,6 successive French governments
have followed a consistent energy program with two fundamen-
tal goals: (1) to provide energy at a minimal cost; and (2) to
limit French dependence on foreign energy sources.7 At the
close of World War II, the French government nationalized the
majority of the fundamental industries, including Electricit6
de France (EDF), which established a governmental monopoly
over energy-related production.8 The employment of nuclear
reactors for major public and commercial use thus remains
under governmental control and precludes nongovernmental
ownership of nuclear facilities
EDF's initial nuclear energy project was the development
of a natural uranium graphite-gas line of reactors. 0 In the
1960's, France realized that the graphite-gas line of reactors
was outdated and thus decided to employ the American
3. Ralph Lapp, an environmental consultant to the Senate Public Works Commit-
tee, said that "the issue centers upon the nagging question about probability of a major
nuclear accident. . . and. . . a modern industrial society demands power. . . . This
means that sites will have to be found for these plants and there will have to be a
balancing of risk and reward." D. BEHRMAN, SOLAR ENERGY: THE AWAKENING SCIENCE
10 (1976).
4. L. SCHEINMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as L. SCHEINMANI.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065.
7. Duirr, L'Energie Nuclaire en France 4, ELECTRICIT9 DE FRANCE (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Dirr].
8. Loi 46-628 (Apr. 8, 1946) [1946] J.O. 2951.
9. See Grzybowski & Dobishinski, Property and Tort in Nuclear Law Today, 10
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 446 (1977).
10. DTrr, supra note 7, at 5. This type of reactor was chosen because, during the
postwar period, France did not want to become dependent on foreign nations for her
development and the fuel needed for this type of reactor was readily available in
France. Id. at 4-5.
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Pressurized-Water-Reactor (PWR)." Export possibilities in the
early seventies were a crucial factor in this decision.'" Then,
shortly after the 1973 oil embargo, the French government de-
cided to accelerate its nuclear energy program. In order to bring
the French nuclear industry under exclusive government con-
trol, the Commissariat 6 1'Energie Atomique (CEA) was au-
thorized to buy back a portion of Westinghouse's interest in
Franatom.' 3
B. Structure of the CEA
After the nationalization of her primary industries,
France's desire to become one of the leading postwar powers led
President de Gaulle to form, under the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the Commissariat e I'.-nergie Atomique." The CEA,
a scientific establishment vested with a civil personality and a
somewhat unique administrative and financial autonomy, was
placed under the control of the President of the Provisional
Government.'5 Its main purpose, according to the enabling or-
dinance, was to research the practical applications of atomic
energy.'" The organization was subsequently modified, and now
the CEA is under the direct authority and control of the Prime
Minister.'" Beneath the Prime Minister are: (1) the Ad-
ministrator-General who acts as both the administrative
director of the CEA, and as the official spokesman and delegate
of the French Government;" and (2) the High-Commissioner
who controls the scientific and technical aspects of the
agency. "9
C. France and Euratom
Late in 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) was created upon the signing of the Treaty of
Rome.2° The Euratom Treaty created an international commis-
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 11. Franatom obtained the requisite licenses from Westinghouse for
PWR construction and Sogerca was licensed by General Electric for production of
Boiling-Water-Reactors (BWR).
13. Id. at 12.
14. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, art. 1, [1945] J.O. 7065.
15. Id. The administrative functions of a traditional French public institution are
delegated to one of the government ministers in the executive branch. See also, L.
SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 9.
16. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065.
17. L. SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 11.
18. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, art. 2, [1945] J.O. 7065.
19. Id. at art. 3. See generally, 2 ASPECTS DU Daorr DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE 68 (H.
Puget ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as H. Puget].
20. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 119581 298
1979
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sion which was to supersede national legislation in this area in
order to maximize the management and exploitation of nuclear
energy and materials in Europe. In spite of conflicting political
and institutional ideologies, the Six generally agreed that Eu-
ratom should be vested with: (1) the right to stock fissionable
materials; (2) the power to create and manage common institu-
tions;2 (3) the coordination of research and planning; and
(4) the right to open the market for nuclear materials and
equipment."
Euratom threatened France's desire to remain a major
postwar power. French atomic development was far superior to
that of its potential partners, and France feared a loss of con-
trol over her vital resources.Y It was not until France was as-
sured that she alone would have control over her atomic mili-
tary rights that she assented to the Euratom Agreement.
D. French Legislation in the Nuclear Field
1. Base Installations
Government intervention and regulation of the nuclear
energy industry are a direct result of the potential public haz-
ards of nuclear materials. The French Government, by means
of Decret 63-1228 of December 11, 1963 (Decree of 1963), speci-
fies legislative requirements for "basic nuclear installations. ' ' 2-
The legislation establishes strict conditions which a base nu-
clear installation must satisfy before proper authorization for
construction can be granted. 6
2. The Decision Processes
The owner-operator of a nuclear facility must submit a
U.N.T.S. 169. The treaty was signed by the original "Six" nations of the EEC: France,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
21. Id. at art. 86. Under the Euratom Treaty, the Community became the legal
owner of all special nuclear materials produced by the member nations. See also,
Smith, The European Atomic Energy Community: The Limits of Supernationalism,
1 CAL. W. L. REv. 33 (1970). The control and management of these institutions rests
on the degree of commitment from the individual countries. The Euratom Treaty
sanctions the inspection and control of nuclear facilities as a safety measure against
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Id. at 37.
22. [1958] 298 U.N.T.S. 169.
23. L. SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 144-45.
24. Id. at 166.
25. D~cret 63-1228 of Dec. 11, 1963, [19631 J.O. 11092, modified in part on March
27, 1973. These regulations place the more important installations, from planning
through functioning, under diverse controls. See Bourgeois, Nuclear Installation Safety
18, ELEcrmcrrg DE FRANcE (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bourgeois].
26. Id. at art. 3.
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series of safety reports to the various administrative offices in
charge of granting construction permits before a license to op-
erate can be granted. The first of these reports is the prelimi-
nary report, which is submitted to the Minister of Industry,
and enumerates the safety measures to be taken by the owner-
operator. 7 Next, the provisional report is submitted to the
Inter-Ministerial Committee for Basic Nuclear Installations
(CIINB) which predicts the performance of the unit as a whole
and of its various safeguard components.2 Then the final report
is submitted to the CIINB after all tests have been completed,
and specifies the actual measured performance of the unit."
An independent agency is required to examine the pro-
posed safety standards to guard against the possible bias of
reports submitted by owner-operators, and to determine the
advisability of granting a license.3 The proposal must then be
reviewed and approved by several government officials before
the Prime Minister finally authorizes the nuclear installation."
A draft proposal is passed, in the following order, from the
Institute for Health, Physics, and Nuclear Safety," to the
Standing Groups, 33 to the Minister of Health, to the Minister
of Industry, to the CIINB, and to the Ministers in charge of
that particular type of nuclear installation for final review.Y
The request for authorization to build a nuclear installa-
27. Bourgeois, supra note 25, at 35. The preliminary reports generally include the
proposed actions of the owner-operators concerning general safety principles, main
technical safety options, design studies, and a preliminary safety study.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The safety reports are sent to a Standing Group of experts who review the
material and then make a proposal, for or against the facility, to the Central Service
for Nuclear Installation Safety.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id. at 36. This administrative body was formed in November 1976, by a joint
order from the Minister of Industry and Research and the Minister of Economy and
Finance. The institute's primary function is to perform studies, research, and works
on physics and nuclear safety. It must also assist and advise the Ministers on CEA
matters.
33. Id. at 37. The Standing Groups are divided into three catagories: the first
group is in charge of nuclear reactors, the second group is in charge of particle accelera-
tor safety, and the third group is in charge of other nuclear installations (such as
reprocessing plants). The Standing Group in charge of a particular institution will
evaluate and combine the safety reports submitted by the Institute for Health, Phys-
ics, and Nuclear Safety. The experts will add any technical specifications which they
deem necessary, and the owner-operator must comply with these specifications.
34. Id. at 39.
1979
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tion"' must contain: (1) the characteristics of the installation;
(2) a descriptive notice of the geographic region and the reason
for the site choice; (3) potential environmental effects; (4) pro-
posed control of the nuclear materials; and (5) security precau-
tions.3 Before the administrative functions are complete, the
public must be given an opportunity to express their views of
the project and of the location of the installation.37
E. Environmental Protection
Article 1 of the law of July 10, 1976, requires that an im-
pact study on the environment and the region surrounding the
proposed site be made each time an operating license is consid-
ered.3 The purpose of the impact study is to systematically
determine the effects of a nuclear facility on the environment,
as well as on the local population.3 ' It is the responsibility of
the owner-operator applicant, public or private, to conduct all
necessary impact studies. 0
Once the impact study is completed, a hearing is held to
familiarize the public with the new installation and to receive
feedback from interested citizens." Hopefully, public scrutiny
will insure an objective, high quality, impact study. Publicity
for the hearing must be paid by the applicant, while the
breadth of publicity is determined by the regional prefect.42
35. See Decree of March 27, 1973, arts. 3 and 6 bis.
36. DgILGATION G9N9RALE A L'CgNERGIE, L'19NERIE NUCLIRE: LE PROJET SUPER-
PH IX A CREYS-MALVILLE 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DtLgGATION GiNgRALE X
L'NFRGIE].
37. Id. See also Dicret 63-1228, art. 8, (Dec. 11, 1963) [1963] J.O. 11093. Under
the provisions of article 8, the Commission must answer, within three months, an
inquiry into the licensing of a particular installation. The article mandates that the
purpose of the prescriptions is to avert all public danger and inconvenience.
38. Loi 76-629 (July 10, 1976) [1976] J.O. 4203, modified by D~cret 77-1141 (Oct.
12, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4948.
39. D~cret 77-1141, arts. 1 & 2, (Oct. 12, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4948. The impact
study should report the initial condition of the site, including agriculture, forests,
marine life, and so forth. The study should also include probable effects on the environ-
ment and population if a nuclear facility is to be located on .the site.
40. D~cret 77-1131, art. 3, clause 4 (Sept. 21, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4849.
41. Id. at art. 5. When the applicant's dossier is complete, the prefect of the region
reviews the findings, and if all requisites have been met, he will order a public hearing.
42. Id. at art. 6. Public notices must be posted in all communities and areas which
will be affected by the facility. Eight days before the hearing adequate notice must be
given in the local or regional newspapers and, if the prefect deems it necessary, he may
require the sponsor to employ other means of communication.
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The impact study and public hearings are designed to include
the public in the decisionmaking process at an early stage, so
information about fundamental issues, particularly environ-
mental quality and public protection, must be available to all
interested parties. The public recommendations are included
in the licensing proposal.
F. Safety Concerns
According to the Decree of 1963, those installations which
cause inconvenience or endanger the public are placed under
the surveillance of administrative authorities." These facilities
are divided into three classes according to the gravity of poten-
tial danger or inconvenience inherent in their exploitation."
Although atomic research and the construction of reactors and
laboratories are under the direction and control of the CEA,
France has public organizations, outside the control of the
CEA, such as les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth), which
perform an important function in the nuclear industry. These
organizations usually act under either the loi du 19 dkcembre
1917 (the Law of 1917) which regulates dangerous establish-
ments, or under the Decree of 1963 which controls potential
public hazards.
Under French regulatory law, only the operator of a nu-
clear installation may receive a construction permit. When all
other necessary licenses have been obtained, the operator be-
comes responsible for the safety of the installation." Minimum
safety standards are established by the Minister of Industry,
Trades, and Crafts." This ministry controls the Central Service
for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (SCSIN), a group of
experts who study the technical problems associated with cre-
ating, servicing, and shutting down nuclear facilities. 8
Article 11 of the Decree of 1963 requires two types of in-
spectors at all primary nuclear installations." The first kind
43. H. Puget, supra note 19, at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Torquat, L 'Organisation des Pouvoirs en France dans le Domaine de la Surete
Nuclaaire 4, ELECTRICITr DE FRANCE (1978) [hereinafter cited as Torquat[.
47. Id. at 5.
48. DELEGATION GENERALE A L'ENERGIE, supra note 36, at 27. SCSIN is concerned
with the licensing of the facility, and with the general preparation and enforcement of
technical specifications concerning the safety of the installation.
49. Ddcret 63-1228, art. 11, (Dec. 11, 1963) [1963] J.O. 11093.
1979
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of inspector falls under the purview of the Law of 1917, and is
charged with the regulation of primary nuclear installations.'"
Inspectors of the second type are agents of the Service Central
de Protection contre les Rayonnements Ionisants (SCPRI).
Their function is to monitor the radioactive pollutants and to
control the effect of pollutants outside of the installation, with
special emphasis on protection of the public health and
safety."
The public is further protected by the Ddcret 75-713 du 4
aoft, 1975 (Decree of 1975) which establishes an Inter-
Ministerial Commission for Nuclear Security." This commis-
sion is responsible for protecting persons and their property
against nuisances and dangers from the creation, functioning,
or shutdown of nuclear facilities.5" France employs "barrier
analysis" in its safety study of reactors. Barrier analysis entails
a study of the reactor once it has been completed, and can be
used on any reactor-type. 4 This independent approach stresses
safety precautions which must be taken to prevent accidents,
and defers until the end of the analysis the review of the reac-
tor's emergency devices. 5
G. Liability and Damages
The owner-operator of a nuclear facility is responsible for
the safety aspects of its operations, and is absolutely liable for
any damages caused by a nuclear reactor, as set forth by the
1960 Paris Convention. 56 The maximum liability of the opera-
tor is 50 million francs per accident, regardless of the number
of facilities on that site.57 The French Government is liable for
amounts not covered by the operator's insurance, up to a maxi-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. DMcret 75-713 (Aug. 4, 1975) [1975] J.O. 8116.
53. Id.
54. Bourgeois, supra note 25, at 27.
55. Id. Each reactor has 3-4 tight barriers: (1) the cladding; (2) the primary
system boundary; (3) the primary; and (4) secondary containment barriers. Each
barrier is analyzed for: (1) normal operating conditions; (2) normal transients (start-
ups, power raising, load variations); and (3) accident transients. Id. at 28-29.
56. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, art. 3, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961). Although article 3 indicates that the
operator is absolutely liable, article 9 states that if the damage is caused by unforesee-
able civil conflicts, civil war, or catastrophic disasters, the operator will not be held
accountable.
57. Loi 68-943, art. 4 (Oct. 30, 1968) [1968] J.O. 10195.
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mum of 600 million francs.3 However, the government is liable
only after the operator has paid the full 50 million franc mini-
mum deductible.
Anxiety about potential nuclear hazards, accompanied by
the construction and operation of the world's largest commer-
cial breeder reactor, the Super-Phdnix, has caused concern in
the environs of Creys-Malville where the facility is located.50
The Super-Phdnix is a joint energy program, controlled by the
French Government and operated by the Centrale Nuclaire
Europ6ene d Neutrons Rapides, S.A. (NERSA) organization.
In full operation, the Super-Phdnix will produce 1200 mega-
watts of electricity from its first five tons of plutonium. This
large amount of plutonium explains the overwhelming public
interest in the Super-Phdnix installation.6 The project was ini-
tiated in January of 1973, after which public meetings and
debates were organized between antinuclear groups, environ-
mentalists, agricultural concerns, and the proponents of the
project. 2 Once the debates and studies were finished, the pro-
ject was approved and work commenced in the spring of 1977 .3
H. Public Action in Nuclear Power Plant Siting
Recent surveys in France indicate that since 1974, when
over three-fourths of the population was in favor of nuclear
energy, the number of nuclear proponents has plunged by
58. Id. at art. 5. See also Brussels Supplementary Convention, 2 Ier'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 685 (1963). Under the Brussels agreement, the signatories indicated a will-
ingness to contribute to a maximum recovery of $120 million, but only after the indi-
vidual insurance and the home state have contributed their shares.
59. Residents of the area have stated that they do not want to be the guinea pigs
for the world's first operational breeder reactor. They feel that there are simply too
many unknown factors, and no one knows exactly what may happen. L'ExPRsss, Aug.
8, 1977, at 28.
60. Centrale Nucldaire Europdenne A Neutrons Rapides, S.A. This group was
formed and controlled by France (EDF) which held a 51% interest. France was joined
by Italy (ENEL) with 33%, Germany (RWE) with 16%, and small interests are owned
by Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain. DiLiGATION G#N9RALE A L'ENERGIE, supra
note 36, at 19.
61. L'ExPRESS, April 17, 1978, at 78. The opponents of the Super-Phdnix are quick
to point out that it only takes six kilos of plutonium to create an atomic bomb. Five
tons of plutonium, which is one of the most toxic and enduring radioactive elements
known to man, presents the danger of an explosion never before paralleled. There are
also dangers ranging from the possibility of small leakages of radioactive effulgents to
the possibility of terrorist attacks. Id.
62. DILtGATION GlNgRALE 1 L'9'NERGIE, supra note 36, at 42.
63. Dfrr, supra note 7, at 15.
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about twenty-five percent." Antinuclear forces, especially the
ecology groups, are a major reason for this decline. In the mu-
nicipal elections of 1977, for example, the ecology groups cre-
ated so much friction that the campaign focused almost en-
tirely on ecological issues. 5
The results of these elections show that ecology groups,
such as les Amis de la Terre and les Groupes Scientifiques pour
I'Information sur I'Energie Nuclaire, are becoming a signifi-
cant power in the political arena."6 Not only have elections been
won or lost because of the "green vote," but the pressure they
exert has also created new legislation which allows for the pro-
tection of the environment as well as providing the legal means
by which these groups can exercise their rights. 7
A renewed vigor was witnessed by these antinuclear fac-
tions when the French Government reemphasized its atomic
energy programs and proposed to build at least forty conven-
tional nuclear plants and one breeder reactor at Creys-
Malville.16 Demonstrations in France against atomic power
plants have been relatively peaceful. However, during the pro-
test against the Super-Phdnix in the summer of 1977, violence
marred the demonstration.69 The demonstration at Creys-
Malville had been planned for several months and nonviolence
was stressed so successfully that many local politicians agreed
to participate. 0 Rend Jannin, the prefect of the department in
which Creys-Malville is located, stated afterward, "we made
several tactical errors." Sufficient safety precautions were not
taken.7" Although German demonstrators have been more
prone to violence, demonstrators now come from all over Eu-
rope and violence appears to have increased."
The majority of participants at the Creys-Malville demon-
stration belonged to environmental groups and were not inter-
64. Sweet, The Opposition to Nuclear Power in Europe, BULL. ATOM. Sci. 41, 44
(Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sweet].
65. Sansen, Le Mouvement Ecologique Franqais, 2 Rgv. GONORALE NUCLEAIRE 3
(1977).
66. Id.
67. See generally D6cret 77-760 (July 7, 1977) [1977] J.O. 3663.
68. TME, Aug. 15, 1977, at 31.
69. L'EXPRESS, Aug. 8, 1977, at 23, 25.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. Sweet, supra note 64, at 43.
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ested in a violent demonstration. However, as the date of the
protest approached, there were many who came solely for a
violent demonstration against the "system." These dissenters
were able to persuade the pacifists that their previous attempts
to stop or change nuclear policy had been entirely futile and
that the time had come for more forceful measures in these
matters.
7 3
The concern of both individuals and interest groups in
nuclear power and the protection of the environment has
caused the Government to delineate the necessary steps for
increased public participation.7' The Government has also in-
dicated a desire to have more individuals participate in mat-
ters that will directly affect their life or lifestyle.
I. Conclusion
Although the French Government recognizes the utility of
nuclear energy and the possibilities it presents for the future
through breeder reactors, other "new energies" are ardently
being explored.7 5 The National Center for Scientific Research,
for example, is one of the world's leading government institu-
tions in the development of solar energy. As the public and
government become more aware of the problems in this area,
new legislative measures are created to promote equitable solu-
tions.
Since France has negligible oil reserves, very little coal,
and no other visible energy possibilities at present, it appears
that the development of nuclear energy is inevitable. The ex-
tent to which demonstrations and public attitudes are able to
change French legislation, and/or stop further development of
nuclear power, appears limited. Whether or not a scientific
breakthrough will allow France to switch completely to solar,
wind, or other "new energies" can be seen only in the future.
Presently, France is aware that without nuclear power massive
73. L'EXPRESS, Aug. 8, 1977, at 28.
74. D~cret 77-760, art. 6-8, (July 7, 1977) [1977] J.O. 3663. See also Circulaire of
Jan. 10, 1977, [1977] J.O. _.
75. As of May 1978, nuclear energy provided 12% of France's electricity. France's
1985 nuclear energy goal has been set at 20%. Le Monde, May 2, 1978.
76. DLUGATION AUX 9NERGIES N'OUVELLES, SOLAR ENERGY FROM FRANCE 22 (1977).
France has a solar furnace at Odefllo-Font-Romeu which is fed by sixty-three flat
mirrors and can reach a temperature of 3,800 *C. There are also several apartment
buildings around France, sponsored by CNRS, which are entirely heated by solar
energy.
1979
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amounts of foreign energy must be purchased. Given the
French spirit of independence, it is doubtful that France would
ever subject herself to the manipulations of energy-producing
nations if French controlled nuclear power were available.
II. NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. History
Shortly after World War II, the United States created the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and monopolized the nu-
clear energy field through the passage of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946." This act was soon replaced by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 which substantially limited the governmental mo-
nopoly of the nuclear field. 8 Although the 1954 Act invited
more participation from private sectors, the nuclear energy
field was slow to develop, due initially to the low cost of alter-
native energy sources.
Change came with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
which abolished the AEC and divided its duties between the
newly formed Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) .7
Regulation and supervision of the construction, maintenance,
licensing, and operation of nuclear power facilities within the
United States was delegated directly to the NRC. The NRC
has divided the licensing process into two steps: (1) a construc-
tion permit for the proposed nuclear reactor;80 and (2) a license
to operate the facility after the reports have been filed and the
surveys taken.8 ' ERDA's functions are to coordinate Federal
77. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) [codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2296 (1976)].
78. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (1954) [codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976)]. Prior to the 1954 Act, private ownership, manufacture, or opera-
tion of a nuclear facility was prohibited, as the entire field was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The passage of the 1954 Act invited public
participation in the nuclear field. However, the government retained absolute control
over nuclear fuels which were to be leased from the government. (This is set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1978) which provides that the Commission shall be the exclusive
owner of all production facilities except: (1) those dealing with research and develop-
ment, which do not make enough fuel for atomic weapons; and (2) those licensed by
the Commission pursuant to §§ 2133-2134 of the Act.)
79. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976). Construction permits are granted only after all
relevant siting criteria, environmental impact statements, and public notices of hear-
ing requirements have been met. See also 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(b) (1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
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activities relating to research and development of various en-
ergy sources.
B. Preemption
Numerous cases have arisen disputing the NRC's appar-
ent exclusive control over the licensing process, in effect, pre-
empting a state's action on matters within its own domain. "
The preemption doctrine, which was first enunciated in
Gibbons v. Odgen,83 allows Federal regulations to take exclu-
sive precedence over similar state regulations, with the excep-
tion of state regulations that pose no direct conflict, or those
which Congress has not unequivocally declared preempted by
Federal legislation.
Although the preemption doctrine has survived many
years of Supreme Court rulings, it has not been adequately
defined. Individual courts have maintained the power to con-
strue state regulatory statutes according to the particular facts
of the case, " and it was not until Northern States Power Co.
v. Minnesota9 that the question of preemption in the atomic
energy area was decided.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave the Federal govern-
ment exclusive jurisdiction and control over the regulation of
all radiation-related hazards in the nuclear field. These joint
judicial and administrative rulings had the effect of totally
preempting the state government from making any indepen-
dent judgments on health and safety issues. " Then, in 1959,
an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 created a
major provision which granted authority to each state to regu-
late the nonradiation hazards within its own territory. The
amendment provided that, "nothing in this action shall be
construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against
radiation."87 This allowed states to participate more meaning-
82. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971). See
generally Yates, Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State
Regulation of Nuclear Facilities Location, Transportation of Radioactive Materials
and Radioactive Waste Disposal, 11 TULSA L. J. 397 (1976).
83. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) (1824).
84. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1974).
85. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
86. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of
Environmental Protection, 377 A.2d 915, 928 (1977).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976). In order to participate in a formal determination
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fully in the siting process of nuclear facilities, and thus negated
complete domination by Federal agencies.
Judge Van Oosterhout, in his dissenting opinion in
Northern States, spoke out strongly against the notion of Fed-
eral preemption in this area.8 He noted that there had been no
apparent congressional intent to preempt this field; otherwise,
Congress would have stated it explicitly in statutes or in their
hearings on nuclear energy."9
C. Environmental Aspects of the Licensing and Siting
Process
The NRC is not solely responsible for the licensing and
siting process at the Federal level. In the often-cited case of
Claverts Cliffs Coordinating Commission v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission,0 the requisite duties of the licens-
ing process, as set forth in the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), are analyzed in detail." Calverts Cliffs pointed
out that NEPA was created to establish "environmental pro-
tection as an integral part of the AEC's basic mandate. . . and
it must itself take the initiative of considering environmental
values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the pro-
cess beyond the staff's evaluation and recommendation. '" 9
However, as broad as this construction may appear, it did not
give an unlimited grant of power to NEPA.' 3
of a nuclear facility siting, the state representative must request a formal hearing
before the Licensing Board as an interested party under 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978).
88. 447 F.2d 1143, 1155 (8th Cir. 1971). "The Supreme Court has uniformly recog-
nized the legislative intent of the state in its laws designed to protect the health and
safety of its citizens and has refused to find federal-preemption over state health and
safety laws, absent a clear and unmistakeable showing of an intent on the part of
Congress to preempt." Id.
89. Id. at 1157. "There is nothing in the statutes which expresses a clear Congres-
sional intent to prohibit the states from taking additional steps deemed necessary to
control air, water and pollution. . . . The language of a statute controls over the
legislative history, which is often ambigious. Congress was aware of the problem and
could have solved it readily by incorporating appropriate language in the Act. It re-
fused to do so." Id.
90. Calverts Cliffs Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
91. Id. at 1112. Under this section, NEPA is not permitted, but rather is com-
pelled, to take environmental values into consideration.
92. Id. at 1119.
93. [19771 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,172.02. NEPA does not require an
unbalanced weighting of the environmental issues over other factors, such as economic,
or health and safety advantages. The purpose of NEPA is to insure that the agencies
give appropriate consideration to the environmental factors in the decision process, but
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Recent decisions have taken the approach of Judge Van
Oosterhout in granting more power to the states and to local
environmental groups while curtailing NRC's "exclusive" pow-
ers. An example in this shift of control can be seen in the recent
Clean Air Act, which transferred the authority to regulate the
radioactive effluents from nuclear power installations from
NRC to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."
Under the new Act, emission limitations may be enforced
by citizen groups as well as by state and local governments.
The Act permits the state to adopt air quality standards which
are more stringent than those imposed by the Federal govern-
ment. This includes control over radioactive pollutants, and
thus overrules that aspect of the Northern States decision. The
Clean Air Act also requires the EPA to determine, by August
7, 1979, whether the emission of radioactive pollutants at the
various sites will endanger public health. If the EPA determi-
nation is affirmative, the radioactive pollutants will continue
to be under EPA control pursuant to the Clean Air Act."
D. Present Siting and Licensing Requirements
1. Application Process
A license to construct or operate a nuclear facility is con-
sidered only upon completion of the application form. This
application must be presented at a public hearing before the
AEC, and section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act requires
that a Notice of Hearing on Application for Construction Per-
mits be printed in the Federal Register thirty days prior to the
hearing. The application must also include safety assessments
and a description of the site, an evaluation of the design and
of the performance of the structures," and, finally, a safety
analysis report. 7
the environmental protection aspect was not established as the exclusive goal.
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (1978). It should be
noted that the NRC maintained the responsibility for prescribing limits, and imple-
menting and enforcing the EPA's radiation standArds.
95. Id. Before EPA lists the source of the pollutant, it must first consult with the
NRC and, no later than six months after the listing, the two agencies must agree to
procedures which will minimize a duplication of their efforts with regard to the regula-
tion of the polluting emmissions.
96. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(1) (1978). Such assessments shall contain an analysis and
evaluation of the major structures, systems, and components of the facility.
97. Id. at (b). The safety analysis report must include information which describes
the facility, and which presents a safety analysis of the structure, systems, compo-
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2. Review Process
First of all, the NRC staff scrutinizes the health, safety,
and environmental aspects of the application, and then drafts
an environmental impact statement. Public comments must
accompany both the application and environmental impact
statement to insure increased public participation." Next, the
Advisory Commission on Reactor Safety (ACRS) must exam-
ine the design of each plant to eliminate possible safety haz-
ards. After the ACRS report is submitted to the Commission,
a public hearing is scheduled. Thirty days notice is required,
and must be printed in the Federal Register."
To increase public involvement and improve community
relations, the Commission has permitted intervenors into the
licensing process on the following grounds: (1) if they can show
an independent injury or, basically, if they can meet judicial
standing requirements; (2) if they live in the immediate vicin-
ity of the proposed facility; or (3) if the Commission feels that
they can significantly contribute to the licensing process.'"
The nuclear installation siting process is one of the most
time consuming aspects of the nuclear development program.
In an effort to speed up this process, Appendix Q to 10 C.F.R.
50 was passed in 1977 to grant the right to request an early site
review to any individual or group.' 01 However, these reviews are
subject to public interest considerations and are not conclusive
until all vital information has been confirmed.'"' Further, the
application for early site approval, if accompanied by a con-
struction permit, will only be effective for a five-year period,
with an additional one-year extension when good cause is
shown. 0'
nents, and the facility as a whole. All current information must be included, such as
results of environmental studies, meteorological monitoring programs, etc,
98. 10 C.F.R. § 51.26 (1978).
99. 10 C.F.R. § 50.58 (1978).
100. The Atomic Energy Act does not mandate public hearings. However, such
participation at an early stage can generate confidence in the Commission, and poten-
tially will cut down the amount of time necessary for subsequent public hearings which
may be required by law.
101. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,882 (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. This new provision will allow any person, state, or other entity to request
a review of the site suitability issues. However, there will be no issuance of a partial
decision concerning the site unless the request for review is made during the construc-
tion permit proceedings. Id. at 22,887.
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As in France, hearings are conducted by nuclear siting
experts because of the technical nature of the issues involved." 4
However, interested individuals may participate in these hear-
ings by filing a petition to intervene pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
section 2.714 (1978).10 5
3. Specific Siting Criteria
Public involvement in the energy field has two major
objectives: (1) to make certain that the facilities are as safe as
possible; and (2) to place the facility in someone else's vicinity,
if at all possible. The possibility of a major nuclear accident,
coupled with the probability of serious problems caused by
radioactive pollution and waste control, makes the correct sit-
ing of a nuclear installation imperative. To aid in the location
of facility sites, the NRC has come up with several evaluation
considerations. 108
The major factors to be considered are population dens-
ity,'0 7 meteorological conditions of the site environs, the in-
tended use of the reactor, the unique qualities of the particular
units, and geological configurations.' When more than one
reactor is proposed for a nuclear power center, assessments
should also include:
A regional evaluation of natural resources, including land, air,
and water resources, available for use in connection with nuclear
energy sites; estimates of future electrical power requirements
* . . economic impact at each nuclear energy site; and considera-
tion of any other relevant factors, including but not limited to
population distribution, proximity to electric load centers and to
other elements of the fuel cycle .... 0
These NRC siting criteria are flexible and were not intended
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976).
105. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978). The petitioner must specifically identify those
aspects of the application to which he is opposed, and must indicate his interest in
the proceedings and the basis for his contention in a petition.
106. 10 C.F.R. § 100.10 (1978).
107. Id. at § 110.3(b). Population density includes the exclusion areas and low
population zones. The exclusion area, as defined in section 100.3, is that area immedi-
ately surrounding the reactor in which the licensee has authority to determine all
activities, including the exclusion of personnel and property. The low population zone
immediately surrounds the exclusion area, and its limited population allows appropri-
ate protective measures to be taken on its behalf in the event of a serious accident.
108. 10 C.F.R. § 100 app. A (1978). Important considerations in this area are the
probability of earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami which could
result in a failure of the facility's functions.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 5847 (1976).
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to be the final word in all situations. For instance, theoretically
there can be no minimum or maximum size for an acceptable
exclusion area, characteristics of the specific area will deter-
mine how large or small the exclusion area should be. However,
the area must be large enough so that an individual located on
its boundary would not, in the event of a postulated accident,
receive a radiation dose in excess of the safe minimum as estab-
lished by the NRC."10
E. Liability Aspects of Nuclear Power Station Siting
Human safety has been the primary reason for establishing
a large exclusion area, but the potential liability for numerous
types of possible accidents has also been a prime consideration.
In fact, it was the basic reason for the slow development of
private nuclear enterprise in the United States. Given the po-
tential liability for a nuclear mishap, it was apparent that if
Federal protection or subsidies were not provided, the public
sector might never get involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Thus, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957,' which
placed a ceiling on the amount of damages that could be re-
covered in any one incident.
The AEC now demands proof that the operator possesses,
and will maintain, adequate financial protection as set forth by
the Commission." 2 The Commission may also require that the
applicant waive any immunity from public liability conferred
by Federal or state laws."' Before 1975, liability was limited to
$560 million. As in France, the operator of a nuclear facility in
the United States must carry enough insurance to cover poten-
tial operational liabilities. However, in the U.S., coverage must
also extend to third party liability."4 Under section (c) of 42
110. 10 C.F.R. § 100.11(a)(1) (1978). The exclusion area must be of such a size
that an individual located at any point on its boundary would not receive, for two hours
immediately following the onset of the fission product release, a total radiation dose
to the whole body in excess of 25 rem. Note 2 explains that 25 rem is the amount NCRP
recommendations allow for a harmless, accidental, or emergency exposure to radiation
workers.
111. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
112. Id. at (a). The Commission will determine the minimum amount of liability
insurance needed by the applicant by taking into consideration: (1) the cost and terms
of private insurance; (2) the type, size, and location of the proposed facility; and (3)
the nature and purpose of the licensed activity. Currently, the applicant must acquire
insurance coverage up to $60 million for any individual accident.
113. Id.
114. Id. at (b), (c).
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U.S.C. 2210 (1976) the Government will indemnify, up to $500
million, those licensees whose license requires less than $560
million coverage. ' 5
F. Nuclear Waste and Safeguards
Another precondition of licensing is that the builder or
licensee must determine the maximum foreseeable accident,
and prove that sufficient safety precautions have been taken to
guard against it. ' In spite of safeguards, there is always the
possibility of a serious accident."7 Waste disposal is one of the
greatest safety hazards associated with a nuclear powered
installation, since radioactive waste generated from the facility
must be carefully handled and isolated for prolonged periods
of time.' Unfortunately, isolation is an expensive and imper-
fect way to control waste." 9 Waste control must be well
planned, for as the court iterated in the Natural Resource
Defense Council case, "Once a series of reactors is operating,
it is too late to consider whether the waste they generate should
115. One of the reasons the Government is still subsidizing the nuclear industry
is that, currently, private insurance will only cover a little over $100 million worth of
liability. Until private insurance is available to substantially protect the public, the
Government will continue to subsidize those portions not covered. See 42 U.S.C. §
2210(b), (c) (1976).
116. D. INGLIS, NUCLEAR ENERGY-ITs PHYSICS AND ITS SOCIAL CHALLENGE 115
(1973). The NRC recently shut down a nuclear facility in Idaho in order to determine
if the safety precautions taken would, in fact, function properly. Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1978, at 1, col. 1.
117. A. LovINS, supra note 2, at 104. This may be demonstrated by the Browns
Ferry incident, in which a technician, while searching for air leaks with a candle,
caused a 7 1/4-hour cable tray fire under the control room. The emergency core cooling
systems (ECCS) failed to function properly, and the only thing that prevented a core
melt was manual control of pumps and valves which were not intended as safety
functions. Another example of potential hazards is illustrated by an incident which
occurred in Idaho when three inexperienced army personnel tried to move a sticky
control rod in an "abnormal" way by hand. The three men were instantly killed by a
burst of radiation, and more than a week passed before shielded clean-up workers were
able to enter the building to remove the bodies. Id. at 116.
118. Id. at 140-41. There is a general two-step method of dealing with spent fuel
rods. The first step is to store them under water at.the facility site until the short-lived
components of radioactivity die off. Next, they are placed in special heavy caskets
designed to absorb radiation and minimize the chances of leakage while being trans-
ported either to fuel reprocessing plants or to underground storage areas.
119. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The decision to license nuclear
reactors, which generate large amounts of toxic wastes and which require a special
isolation from the public and the environment for several centuries, is "a paradigm of
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which must receive detailed
analysis under § 102(2)(C)(v) of NEPA" as found in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(v).
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have been produced. '"'2 This decision is particularly significant
because it finds that the NEPA regulations require considera-
tion of the environmental effects of nuclear waste during the
initial stages of the licensing process. Additionally, the NRC
must consider the environmental aspects of the reprocessing of
nuclear waste before granting a construction permit.''
G. U.S. Public Interaction in the Siting Process
1. Case History of the Seabrook, New Hampshire Site
The Seabrook nuclear facility site was chosen from nine-
teen possible New Hampshire locations in mid-1973. From the
outset, there has been opposition to the Seabrook facility, gen-
erated principally from the Clamshell Alliance and Friends of
the Earth. The NRC waited two years for final approval of the
Seabrook site as a result of the environmentalist opposition.
In response to recent attempts to change the site, the NRC
has stated that, "the test to be employed in assessing whether
or not a proposed site is to be rejected in favor of another site
is whether an alternative site is obviously superior to the site
already approved. 12 Thus, it is apparent that a change will be
made only under unusual circumstances brought about by
time, environmental oversights, or other factors which would
make an alternative site superior.
In 1977, the Clamshell Alliance staged a successful demon-
stration against the Seabrook site. The demonstration was
planned well in advance, and nonviolence was emphasized.
Volunteers were trained in the methods of nonviolent resist-
ance and were to instruct small groups at the demonstration.1'
The protest culminated with the peaceful occupation of the
Seabrook site by over 1400 demonstrators. The resistance train-
120. 547 F.2d 633, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 641. Environmental groups find this case significant because, "absent
effective generic proceedings to consider these issues, they must be dealt with in
individual licensing proceedings." This will give the opponents of nuclear power at
least one more chance to slow down, or temporarily stop, reactor construction.
122. [1977] 2 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) T 30,216.8. At least two significant
realities of the NEPA process support the use of the standard of obvious superiority:
(1) the inherent imprecision of cost/benefit analysis; and (2) the probability that more
adverse information has been developed respecting the closely examined site than any
alternative site.
123. TIME, May 16, 1977, at 59. The reason for increased participation in mass
protests was best summarized by a spokesmen for the Clamshell Alliance, "We feel
Seabrook in particular and nuclear power plants in general are life and death issues,
we are acting in self-defense."
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ing was so successful that it took police several hours to remove
the majority of the demonstrators.' 4 Then in June 1978, after
negotiations with state officials, the Seabrook demonstration
site was transformed into an "energy fair" attended by 20,000
persons.'25 The Seabrook incidents have signaled a new phase
of mass public protest against nuclear power.' 6
In 1976, public protest in the German town of Whyl forced
authorities to close that site and halt all construction of the
nuclear power plant. 27 One reason that these demonstrations
have gained such magnitude and attendance is that people are
becoming more frightened of nuclear facilities. Public fear
slows down the construction and licensing of these facilities,
thus increasing cost. In addition, every concession and every
added safeguard become a minimum demand for future facili-
ties. It is no wonder that concessions to public demands are
made reluctantly.
2. Facilities
The NRC licensing board is aware that the public desires
to participate in the siting process, but given the technicality
of the issues and the delay caused by public intervention, the
licensing commission would like to limit public involvement.
Since the NRC is an administrative body, it is able to focus on
future events and political consequences instead of being en-
cumbered by precedent.'28 This makes intervention all the
more appealing since an individual who successfully argues his
position may halt an entire project. As stated previously, an
individual may intervene if he can show a potential harm, has
standing, or lives in the vicinity of the project. He must not
124. NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1977, at 25. The "en masse" protests may have very
serious effects on nuclear facility siting. As a purely economic factor, the Seabrook
seige is an excellent example. While the demonstrators, held in the New Hampshire
National Guard armories, were awaiting trial, it cost the state more than $50,000 per
day to care for them.
125. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1978, at A18, col. 1. See also id. June 26, 1978, at A14,
col. 2.
126. NEWSWEEK, supra note 124, at 25.
127. Id.
128. The administrative process is not an entirely independent proceeding. Judi-
cial adjudication reviewing administrative functions were divided into three basic
groups in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971): (1) the court
must first delineate the scope of the agency's authority, and then closely examine the
facts to determine if the agency acted within its authority; (2) the decision made by
the agency must not be arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion; and (3) the court must
determine whether the agency adequately followed necessary procedural requirements.
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only show how his interest will be affected, but must also spe-
cifically detail the problem he wishes to remedy.
An intervenor may petition for an amendment to any ad-
ministrative regulation, for the passage of a new rule, or for the
appeal of rules through the Administrative Procedure Act 2 ' or
through 10 C.F.R. section 2.805(b) (1978). However, the peti-
tion must reflect "meaningful participation," not merely a
delay tactic. This is ensured, in part, by the NRC requirement
of proper standing.
There is ample justification for allowing public participa-
tion in the licensing process of nuclear facilities. Proponents of
nuclear energy argue that intervention lengthens the construc-
tion time and thus increases the cost of facilities. On the other
hand, opposition to nuclear energy is intense, and those who
are denied an outlet for their objections will delay projects by
various methods of demonstration, judicial intervention, and
administrative slowdowns. In reality, significant participation
by intervenors would ameliorate the entire process; issues
would be identified more readily and accurately; and the power
to influence an NRC decision would reduce unnecessary delay,
thereby saving time and money.
H. Public Interaction in Siting
The use of nuclear power is an emotional, frequently de-
bated issue. Violence and increased attendance at mass pro-
tests necessitate a constructive program of public participa-
tion. The program should serve a twofold purpose: (1) to permit
the public to participate in and contribute to the licensing
process; and (2) to disclose all information, and to identify and
resolve major issues at the preconstruction stage of develop-
ment. 110
Notice of nuclear license and site hearings is available only
to those who habitually read the Federal Register. This is an
unrealistic and ineffective way to give notice: supplemental
notices are necessary. As set forth in International Harvester
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). See also Bain, Informal Rulemaking: Quest of
Nuclear Licensing Reform, 55 DEN. L. J. 177 (1978).
130. The public is reluctant to accept the findings of the NRC or the public utility
operators of nuclear facilities on the safeworthiness of an installation. The NRC, public
utilities, and intervenors must make full disclosures in the initial proceedings if the
system is to improve.
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Co. v. Ruckleshaus,'3' adequate notice requires that the public
be informed of the proposed regulations. In addition, all issues
must be delineated, and descriptions of critical experiments
must be included in the notice.
The public must be given complete, timely, and promi-
nent notice. Since states have become more involved in nuclear
siting and regulation, they should shoulder the responsibility
of insuring adequate public notice concerning facilities within
their own jurisdiction. Local newspapers and the electronic
media could be used effectively to advertise the hearings.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The nuclear power question cannot be left to the exclusive
control of governments. Groups and individuals in many coun-
tries have demonstrated a genuine concern for their safety, as
well as a desire to effectively participate in the licensing pro-
cess. Public concern is evidenced in the legislative and electoral
processes of most nuclear powers.'32
Nuclear energy is a controversial issue which will receive
even more attention in the future. It is thus important that at
least two objectives be met in the near future: (1) the public
must be allowed to participate more effectively in the licensing
process; and (2) alternative sources of energy must be devel-
oped.
Public participation in France and the United States has
increased. Unfortunately, there are many problems yet to be
resolved. For instance, the United States could follow France's
example by expanding and diversifying public hearing notices,
and France could allow more direct public participation in the
licensing process. In both the United States and France, public
relations need improvement. Since the public is skeptical of
nuclear energy, proponents should take the offensive rather
than the defensive: the public needs to be informed of the
safety features and successes of existing nuclear programs. In-
131. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. Sweet, supra note 64, at 41. The anti-nuclear sentiment was so strong in
Sweden that it culminated in victory for those politicians who espoused anti-nuclear
views.
In Austria, the anti-nuclear movement has been so successful that the 700mw
Zwentendorf nuclear facility, which was completed at a cost of $650 million, and which
is now standing idle, was rejected by Austrian voters in a national referendum. Rocky
Mountain News, Nov. 6, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
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formation must be more widely disseminated and must be
more readily available to the public in a form that is neither
too technical nor too simplistic.
France, the United States, and the world need more than
energy conservation and an alternative energy program in the
near future: that conclusion is inescapable. A complete with-
drawal from nuclear energy, even if commercially viable, would
be impractical and unrealistic. We must therefore use the re-
sources available to us, and make the best of a difficult situa-
tion.
